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Bank Structure and Mortgage Rates: Reply 
Michael L. Marlow 
In Marlow (1982), i estimated a model of interest rate determination suggesting that 
interstate banking will, ceteris pa:ibus, decrease competition i the n~ongage market if 
it lowers the number of competing firms and increases deposit concentration levels. I
identified statistically significant relations between mortgage rates and the num~r of 
firms, concentration ratios, a unit banking dummy, and the number of commet~c:al 
bank offices divided by the n~ambers of savings banks and savings and loan assc~.~a- 
tions. Timothy Curry and John Rose argue that despite these"impressive" results, my 
empirical work involving the use of concentration ratios is flawed in two respect:~. In
this Reply, ! argue that Curry and Rose suffer from the same "f law" in one case a~ld 
introduce an arbitrary assumption i the other case. 
Curry and Rose argue that it is incorrect not to consolidate bank subsidiaries of 
multibank holding companies (MBHC) when computing bank content, ation data. Tire 
issue is whether or not MBHCs operate as integrated, single entities imilar to branches 
of banks. Curry and Rose argue m the affirmative, based on survey evidence in Rose 
(1978); Golembe (1978); and Whalen (1981). 
Two points are in order. First, Rose (1978, p. 71) mentions that " . . .  studies of the 
cperating policies of parent companies typically involve ad hoc survey work, the 
results of which often do not lend themselves ~o statistical analysis." Nonetheless, he 
argues that survey analysis uggests that MBHCs have witnessed an increasing degree 
of centralization over time. Second, there exist empirical studies on the issue that are 
not mentioned in Curry and Rose. tThe studies of Ware (1975); Light (1975); Rhoades 
(1975); Goldberg (1976); Hoffman (1976); Whitehead a~d King (1976); and Rhoades 
(1977) find no evidence that MBHCs h lye exerted systematic effects on market compe- 
tition. Evidehce of minor effects on competition, via small scale ntry, is foun¢l in 
Heggestad and Rhoades (1976A) and Schweitzer and Greene (1977). It should be noted 
that small scale ntry will not typically alter three-firm concentration ratios, l~trge 
scale entry effects on competition are found in Heggestad and Rhoades (1976B). 
Which type of evidence are we to believe? The survey evidence ~uggests hat we 
should consolidate and the empirical evidence suggests the opposite. While I prefer 
empirical over survey evidence, the issue remains unsettled. However, note that ~he 
reestimation of my model in Curry and Rose sheds ome light on this point. Reestina- 
For an e;~cellent sumr.~ary of empirical studies, see Rhoades (1978). 
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tion using consolidated ata (in place of my unconsolidated data) shows ihat both the 
coefficiem and significance level of the concentration variable decline. For example, 
the t-statistic for concentration meas+Jred in terms of all firms falls from 2.'86 [Eqt+ation 
(3)] to 1.95 [Equation (5)]. As sugge gted in Curry a~d Rose, the assumption of central- 
ized decision making may be wrong. This result is consistent with t e above-mentioned 
empirical :gtudies uggesting that the MBHC movement has exerted little, if any, effect 
on market competition. In other wo~'ds, Curry and Rose support he use of unconsoli- 
dated concentration data in market structure-performance studies. 
Curry and Rose also argue that I err in measuring firm concentration i terms of 
commercial banks alone and that their measure, which includes thrifts, is superior. 
Wh:,le theiir measure is an interesting avenue to explore, its significance is dubious. 
Clearly, both of our measures uffer from the same problem; concentration i the 
mortgage market should control for relative market participation by all lenders. That 
is, a ~t ter  measure would weigh the dominance of leading firms by their relative 
mortgage ~:ommitment activity in the SMSA. Since neither of our measures control for 
this problem, both of our studies are subject o the same error. 
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